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She is also the chair of the Latin American Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (CLAAF). From March 1998 to October 2000, she served as managing director and chief economist for Latin America at Deutsche Bank. Before joining Deutsche Bank, Rojas-Suarez was the principal advisor in the Office of Chief Economist at the Inter-American Development Bank. Between 1984-1994 she held various positions at the International Monetary Fund, most recently as deputy chief of the Capital Markets and Financial Studies Division of the Research Department. She has been a visiting fellow at the Institute for International Economics, a visiting advisor at the Bank for International Settlements and has also served as a professor at Anahuac University in Mexico and advisor for PEMEX, Mexico’s National Petroleum Company. Rojas-Suarez has also testified before a Joint Committee of the US Senate on the issue of dollarization in Latin America.
She has published widely in the areas of macroeconomic policy, international economics and financial markets in a large number of academic and other journals including Journal of International Economics, Journal of International Money and Finance, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Contemporary Economic Policy, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. She has also published or being cited in prestigious newspapers such as the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. She is also regularly interviewed by CNN en Español.
Michael P. Dooley & Donald J. Mathieson & Liliana Rojas-Suarez, 1997. "Capital Mobility and Exchange Market Intervention in Developing Countries" NBER Working Papers 6247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Rojas-Suarez, L & Weisbrod, S-R, 1997. "Financial Markets and the Behavior of Private Savings in Latin America" Working Papers 340, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
McNelis, P.D. & Rojas-Suarez, L., 1996. "Exchange rate depreciation, Dollarization and Uncertainty: A Comparison of Bolivia and Peru" Working Papers 325, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Rojas-Suarez, L. & Weisbrod, S.R., 1996. "Banking crises in Latin America: Experience and Issues" Working Papers 321, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Rojas-Suarez, L. & Weisbrod, S.R., 1996. "Building Stability in Latin American Financial Markets" Working Papers 320, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Rojas-Suarez, L. & Weisbrod, S.R., 1996. "Managing Banking Crises in Latin America: The Di's and Don'ts of Successful Bank Restructuring Programs" Working Papers 319, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Rojas-Suarez, L. & Weisbrod, S., 1994. "Achieving Stability in Latin American Financial Markets in the Presence of Volatile Capital Flows" Working Papers 304, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
Many emerging economies could benefit from insurance against this backdrop of volatility. Fortunately, cheap and no-strings-attached liquidity insurance exists, in the form of the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line (FCL) for countries with very strong policy fundamentals; for countries with somewhat weaker, but still sound fundamentals, the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) offers a similarly good deal. But these precautionary instruments remain underutilized. We have some suggestions on how the IMF could fix this.
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the IMF undertook a series of reforms to its lending facilities to manage volatility and help prevent future crises. The reforms included the adoption of two new lending instruments: the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), introduced in 2009, and the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), introduced in 2011. They are meant to serve as precautionary measures—effectively, as insurance—for member states with a proven track economic record. Yet, the IMF’s precautionary instruments remain underutilized.
This paper addresses four misconceptions (or ‘myths’) that have likely played a role in the limited utilization of the IMF’s two precautionary credit lines, the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). These myths are 1) too stringent qualification criteria that limit country eligibility; 2) insufficient IMF resources; 3) high costs of precautionary borrowing; and 4) the economic stigma associated with IMF assistance. We show, in fact, that the pool of eligible member states is likely to be seven to eight times larger than the number of current users; that with the 2016 quota reform IMF resources are more than adequate to support a larger precautionary portfolio; that the two IMF credit lines are among the least costly and most advantageous instruments for liquidity support countries have; and that there is no evidence of negative market developments for countries now participating in the precautionary lines.
Since mid-2016, a new wave of political developments in advanced countries has been shaking Latin America. This latest assessment of the Latin American Committee on Financial Issues (CLAAF) examines how the anti-globalist movement sweeping the West will affect macroeconomic trends in Latin America.
In 2016 on the CGD Podcast, we have discussed some of development's biggest questions: How do we pay for development? How do we measure the sustainable development goals (SDGs)? What should we do about refugees and migrants? And is there life yet in the notion of globalism? The links to all the full podcasts featured and the work they reference are below, but in this edition, we bring you highlights of some of those conversations.
In spite of recent progress in the usage of alternative financial services by adult populations, Latin America’s financial inclusion gaps have not reduced, relatively to comparable countries, and, in some cases, have even increased during the period 2011-2014. Institutional weaknesses play the most salient role through direct and indirect effects. Lack of enforcement of the rule of law directly reduces depositors’ incentives to entrust their funds to formal financial institutions. Indirectly, low institutional quality reinforces the adverse effects of insufficient bank competition on financial inclusion.
CGD continued its commitment to the subject of financial inclusion with the release this March of Financial Regulations for Improving Financial Inclusion. As co-chairs of the Task Force that produced this report, we are enthused to see much alignment between the High-Level Principles of the G20 and the CGD Task Force report.
More than $3.4 billion inflows into Emerging Markets (EMs) in the week following Brexit—the largest weekly amount on record—looks like good news. Yes, but here is why EMs should not relax in a time of global uncertainty.
The CGD Task Force on Access to Financial Services proposes 10 principles for financial-sector policymakers—including national authorities, donors, private-sector participants, international financial institutions, and others—on the facilitation, regulation, and direct provision of financial services.
Economic recovery in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is gaining momentum, but more work is needed to ensure growth is both sustainable and inclusive. Looking ahead, activity is expected to gather further momentum—reflecting stronger demand at home and a supportive external environment. But there are still challenges ahead. Risks to the region’s outlook reflect internal factors as well as heightened external risks—notably, a shift towards more protectionist policies and a sudden tightening of global financial conditions. Additionally, longer-term growth prospects for Latin America and the Caribbean remain subdued.
How resilient are emerging market economies to potentially tougher external conditions, especially if they become prolonged? This paper takes the view that initial economic conditions before the eruption of an adverse external shock matter, and they matter a lot.
Here at CGD, we’re always working on new ideas to stay on top of the rapidly changing global development landscape. Whether it’s examining new technologies with the potential to alleviate poverty, presenting innovative ways to finance global health, assessing changing leadership at international institutions, or working to maximize results in resource-constrained environments, CGD’s experts are at the forefront of practical policy solutions to reduce global poverty and inequality. Get an in-depth look below at their thoughts on the 2018 global development landscape.
This paper explores the impact of international financial integration on credit markets in Latin America. The overall effect is positive, but the foreign banks do tend to amplify the impact of foreign shocks on credit and interest rates. Important policy recommendations include ring-fencing mechanisms, early-warning systems, and the incorporation for agreements between domestic and foreign supervisors.
This new report by a group comprising several of Latin America's most influential economic policymakers, CGD senior fellow Liliana Rojas Suarez, and CGD president Nancy Birdsall suggests ways for the IDB to become more flexible and to step up its support for market oriented reforms. The IDB's new president, Luis Alberto Moreno, warmly endorsed the recommendations, calling them "a key agenda."
“Latin America is no exception regarding the adverse changes in emerging market conditions that have occurred since the US Fed began reducing Quantitative Easing (QE) in May 2013.” That’s the assessment of the Latin American Shadow Regulatory Committee (or CLAAF) in its latest statement.
Each of the G20 summits of the past seven years has suffered in comparison with the London and Pittsburgh Summits of 2009, when the imperative of crisis response motivated leaders, finance ministers, and central bankers to coordinate effectively with each other. Subsequent summits have lacked the same sense of urgency and have failed to deliver any kind of agenda that can be pinpointed as clearly as “saving the global economy.” This week’s summit in Hamburg, Germany promises more of the same, with the real possibility that the G20’s stock could fall even further at the hands of a non-cooperative US delegation.