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The issue of family planning has been high on the international agenda recently. Earlier this month, London hosted a pledging conference where some donors promised generous funding for efforts to increase access to and education around family planning services in developing countries.
At the same time, however, there is increasing uncertainty about future support from the US, which has historically been one of the biggest donors. There is also growing concern about the world’s limited progress towards the family planning goals that were agreed upon in 2012, through the international framework known as FP2020.
Just how much progress have we made, and how far do we have to go? What difference will the new pledges make, and how should they be used? “There’s an opportunity to use the funds to plug some of those holes, but it will depend on how they’re managed and allocated,” Rachel Silverman, CGD’s assistant director of global health policy, tells me in this week’s podcast.
One priority, Silverman says, is to help donors “work together to make sure the funding is directed in a coordinated way towards the areas of most need, the areas where the funding can go the furthest.” Recommendations on how to do just that can be found in CGD’s recent report Aligning to 2020, and you can learn more about how to get the best health value for your money in CGD’s forthcoming book What’s In, What’s Out.
In the meantime, click below to hear more of Silverman’s thoughts on the subject and check out the full podcast at the top of this page.
This past Tuesday, I attended the London Family Planning Summit, a high-level and high-profile gathering co-hosted by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and UNFPA with the goal of raising financial and political support for international efforts to expand contraceptive access to women and girls living in low- and middle-income countries. This follow-on event comes five years to the day after the original 2012 London Summit kicked off the global FP2020 movement, aiming to reach an additional 120 million women and girls with modern contraception by 2020. Watching the summit, one might understandably be overcome with a sensation of déjà vu: same issue, same co-hosts, same location, same hopeful tone, and same basic program (advocacy mixed with financial and programmatic pledging). But context is everything—and the summit’s optimistic tenor at times felt dissonant given the slower than hoped for progress over the past five years and the deep perils of the current political moment. With significant new money raised for the cause—an important accomplishment given the uncertainty around sustained US funding and the reinstatement of the Mexico City Policy—it’s now time for donors to get serious about optimizing the efficiency, impact, and sustainability of family planning programs.
How much did donors commit? A lot
First, the good news: the summit attracted meaningful new financial commitments that will be genuinely helpful in the years ahead. I’ve done my best to compile a quick and dirty “cheat sheet” of financial donor government, foundation, and private sector commitments of >US$1 million (see below). The cheat sheet is based on media reports, my own observation, and the online commitment tracker. But it can be quite difficult to distinguish “new money” from existing commitments, or to parse whether NGOs are double-counting the contributions of their donors.
By my count (involving a number of guesses and judgment calls), the summit resulted in about $870 million of truly new donor commitments, plus about $340 million that had already been announced or allocated in some form, and additional commitments from FP2020 focus countries for domestic spending. The biggest chunks of donor money come from the Gates Foundation (an increase of $375 million, or 60 percent over their already very substantial baseline spending through 2020); the United Kingdom (an extra £45 million per year through 2022); and Canada (US$188 million through 2020 from its previously announced Can$650 commitment to sexual and reproductive health). A number of donors committed only for 2017, and yet others indicated that further commitments are likely to be on the way, so overall totals could still rise. That’s a very significant sum of donor money, particularly on top of many donors’ substantial baseline contributions. (Again, I emphasize these figures are very rough estimates.)
Donor commitments at the London Family Planning Summit >US$1 million
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
60% increase above baseline levels of support
On top of baseline £180m per year
$188m ($241 CAD)
Part of already announced package
Part of $650 million over three years for SRHR announced in March
$84m (NOK 700m)
Includes an additional $12m per year in core UNFPA funding, $6pm to UNFPA supplies, $49m for She Decides, on top of baseline funding levels.
Reflects 2017 increase in investments
Medicins du Monde*
About $44m (SEK $369m)
Approximate figures based on narrative of commitment. Mostly already announced/awarded increases in funding.
$41.4 m (€36m)
For UNFPA core funding
For SRHR in humanitarian settings, CERF, and She Decides
$25.5m ($33.5m AUD)
$3.5m AUD is for 2017 support to UNFPA supplies
Unclear – seemingly already allocated
For UNFPA supplies
$11.3m (DKK 75m)
Unclear – seemingly already allocated
For UNFPA supplies/IPPF
For UNFPA in Syria
To support Adolescents 360 partnership in Tanzania
* May be double-counting government or foundation donor support
Now it’s time to put the money to work
But with the successful rah-rah moment now behind us, it’s time for donors to get real about disappointing progress to date, ongoing financial and policy challenges, and the uncertainty of US financial support. Many of these issues should be familiar to anyone in the field, but to briefly recap: as of the 2016 midpoint, FP2020 reported that 30.2 million additional women and girls were using modern contraception compared to the 2012 baseline—6.2 million more than historical trends would predict, but 19.2 million below hoped for progress. A number of committing focus countries have not made good on their financial commitments from the original summit, even as they recommit this week. In most low- and middle-income countries, national or subnational government funding represents just a tiny sliver of the family planning funding base. FP2020 as a mechanism has struggled to define its identity and balance competing demands for advocacy, measurement, accountability, and technical support. Donor countries have found their aid budgets stressed by shifting political winds and the refugee crisis (though the latter issue appears to be abating at least in some countries). The Trump administration has reinstated the Mexico City Policy, stripping funding from a number of leading family planning providers. And although the hot-off-the-press draft House omnibus suggests only modest cuts to the US family planning budget for FY2018 (in contrast to the administration’s requested program elimination), the uncertainty means that the US is no longer a reliable partner to fund the recurrent costs of service delivery and commodity procurement.
The time is ripe to move beyond feel-good rhetoric and to confront these challenges head-on. Last year, working with the FP2020 partners, we issued a report with recommendations for donors to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of their investments—ideas that have taken on new urgency in the current climate. You can read the full report here, but for now I would highlight two under-examined areas:
Create better incentives for country co-financing. Too many countries are almost entirely dependent on donor funding for contraceptive commodities and service delivery—and that means that women and girls are deeply vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of donor countries’ politics. If the US funding faucet were to turn off, about 10 million women would lose access to contraceptives in low-income countries alone. Real country buy-in means that countries have their own fiscal skin in the game. Instead of pushing ministries of health to cough up funds based on rhetorical pressure alone, it’s past time for USAID and UNFPA Supplies to require co-financing for contraceptive donations, drawing from the GAVI model for vaccines. The copays could be extremely small at first, then gradually increase as countries grow wealthier, helping incentivize investment.
Ensure family planning is included and delivered effectively as part of health benefits packages. As universal health coverage has risen on the international agenda, many low- and middle-income countries are defining explicit health benefits packages as entitlements for their entire populations and creating health financing strategies to promote their effective delivery. Family planning does appear on most lists of essential health services, but a Marie Stopes International study suggests it is being frequently left off the reimbursable list of services and instead shunted into capitation packages or input-based budgets. Rather than simply pushing for a family planning line item in budgets (that can be removed at any time and does not necessarily create strong incentives for progress), family planning advocacy should be redirected to ensuring inclusion of a rights-based package of family planning commodities and services in the health benefits package, supported by financing arrangements that incentivize high-quality service delivery. In so doing, there are two key challenge. First, family planning may not be cost-effective as a health intervention alone in the most resource-constrained settings, but qualify for inclusion based on rights-based or actuarial criteria. (For more on how to conceptualize these issues, check out my chapter in the forthcoming CGD book on the design of health benefits packages.) Second, countries must design health financing strategies that incentivize high-quality service delivery but avoid undue coercion. There’s an important opportunity here for the family planning community to engage with the broader health financing conversation—an imperative for long-term program sustainability.
I encourage you to read the full report; we also have much to say about moving toward more rigorous resource allocation strategies and increasing accountability for implementers and service providers. The bottom line: the additional resources for family planning are fantastic. Now it’s our responsibility—to the women and girls who need to gain or sustain access to contraception, and to the taxpayers and private individuals funding these efforts—to make sure we use that money as effectively as possible.
The Women's Entrepreneurship Facility (We-Fi) announced at the G20 Summit stands out as a tangible initiative to help address a significant, but often ignored, constraint to growth and job creation—the wide global gender gap in starting and growing businesses. It is telling that, at a time when growth and inequality are core economic concerns, G20 countries have chosen to place an important bet on women entrepreneurs.
No one expects We-Fi in and of itself to solve global growth challenges. But by supporting women-owned or led businesses with growth potential, it invests where returns are likely to surprise on the upside. We-Fi aims to leverage $325 million to be provided by donors (including $50 million from the US) to mobilize more than $1 billion from international financial institutions (IFIs) and commercial sources.
There have been previous efforts to provide finance to women-owned SMEs—for example, the IFC's Women's Entrepreneurship Opportunity Facility (WEOF) launched in 2014, and the IDB's Women's Entrepreneurship Banking initiative (WEB) launched in 2012. But We-Fi takes a new, holistic evidence-based approach. Its distinctive features are: (1) a multidimensional strategy that goes beyond just finance to include help with skills, access to information and networks, and access to markets; (2) engagement with governments on the laws, regulations, and policies that discriminate against women entrepreneurs; (3) support for women’s start-ups and early stage firms; (4) equity investments in women's businesses, as well as lending through banks and other financial intermediaries; and (5) use of blended finance to share risk and solve market failures in order to unlock commercial finance.
What will success look like? This is an ambitious, path-breaking effort. Its results should be lasting and transformational. As my colleague Cindy Huang noted in a previous CGD blog, there are an array of challenges to be considered. As We-Fi takes shape, this is the time to think about what all these coordinated interventions should achieve and how results might be measured.
Typically, results of such programs are measured in terms of the amount of finance provided by the facility, the number of financial intermediaries participating, the number of women entrepreneurs supported, and perhaps the impact of expanded access to finance on women's business performance. All that is well and good, but it would be even better to go further and to measure what happens to the behavior of key market actors—women business owners, corporations that include women’s businesses in their value chains, financial intermediaries, angel investors, venture capitalists, and accelerator managers. The aim should be to change behavior so that women have better access to, and can seize, more productive opportunities long after We-Fi’s projects end.
This requires asking a deeper set of questions to assess impact: Are women starting and growing businesses in nontraditional, high-growth-potential sectors such as tech-intensive firms (rather than the current high concentration in consumer goods and services)? Are banks targeting women clients as part of their business strategies? Are they deploying innovative credit-scoring methodologies that are gender neutral? Are they funding lending to women out of their own resources? Are they offering products targeted for women's needs and preferences? Is the share of women's businesses in angel and venture investment increasing? (Globally, it is around 5 percent.)
Not only the amount but also the composition of finance mobilized by We-Fi are critical to judging its success. One hopes there is sufficient emphasis on private, commercial finance, not just on mobilizing finance from the IFC and other IFIs. It would be helpful to know more about the track record of IFC's WEOF so far. What is the ratio of IFC commitments to other lender finance? And how much of that mobilized finance is from the private sector? What are the targets for We-Fi?
Finally, this is an important opportunity to contribute meaningfully to filling the gender data gap that is hampering progress in understanding the needs of women entrepreneurs, the kinds of interventions that work best, and the potential returns from engaging women-owned businesses as clients and suppliers. Access to funding from We-Fi should come with strong requirements for collecting and sharing gender disaggregated data (while protecting business confidentiality).
Rains have come early this year in the Karauli district, located in the state of Rajasthan in north India and sandwiched between the Taj Mahal, a famous tiger reserve, and the palaces of Jaipur. Kheri, a medium-sized village of nearly 500 households and a smorgasbord of castes and religions, is getting ready for a good harvest season. Tractors go up and down the narrow unpaved roads; the villagers are up early tending their fields sowing bajra, the coarse grain that is the staple of much of this region; and bullocks block the path sitting in the pools of mud that the rains have helpfully created for them. There is an unchanging nature to this scene, much like it has been for centuries past.
But change has come to Kheri, especially over the last half a decade. It has become the digital frontier where the new India meets the old. I am here to see first-hand how a large program of the Government of Rajasthan, known as Bhamashah, is being implemented on the ground. The program is registering all family members under a single identity document known as the “Bhamashah Card,” linking it to lists of beneficiaries in over one hundred social programs such as food rations, old age and widow pensions, scholarships, etc. Having the card also means that each below poverty line (BPL) family gets a one-time enrolment grant of 2000 rupees (around $30) deposited directly into their bank account and health insurance plan where they can access both public and private healthcare providers.
The card also links each individual member’s Aadhaar—India’s biometric id number—to the Bhamashah database eliminating false or duplicate registrations from the subsidy delivery system. Most importantly, it mandates that the card is registered under the name of the woman, effectively making her the head of the household. In a society famous for its patriarchy, this is nothing short of shaking up the very foundations of gender relations that has existed over thousands of years.
Bhamashah card of Asha Devi, Kheri Village, Karauli District, Rajasthan
Our survey team moves through the village identifying houses to randomly administer a questionnaire that we have designed with our local partners, MicroSave. As we go through the questions, crowds gather around, curious of what’s happening. The village headman gets word that a “team” from Delhi is here to know about Bhamashah, leading to some interesting discussion on why we are here and what our (ulterior) motives are. The conversations are generally good-natured and end with an offer—or rather insistence—of having tea at his house before we leave.
The villagers, of course, have their views. They are generally satisfied about the enrolment process and told us that they got the card made because “everyone else was getting it.” Everyone has an Aadhaar number, all women we spoke to had bank accounts, and most had linked the two. But getting food rations seems to be the main issue—many said that they did not know why they were not getting it regularly. Our team conducted several focus group discussions separately with the villagers and the local administration. We hope to get a clearer picture of why this is happening and how the issue can be resolved.
Old Age Pension Scheme Beneficiary, Mahendwara Village, Karauli District, Rajasthan
Overall, it seemed that Karauli is now firmly in the digital ecosystem that India is building with Aadhaar, financial inclusion, and the mobile revolution—the so-called ‘JAM’ trinity. But it still has to overcome significant challenges of poverty and inequality. In a state that is similar in size and population to Germany, it is no small achievement to take on the ambitious task of providing each family with a unique ID and deliver it within a short span of three years.
The possibilities of 80 million people in Rajasthan participating in digital governance is immense. But as an older woman who did not know her own age told us, “making peoples’ lives better is more than delivering just a card.”
Each of the G20 summits of the past seven years has suffered in comparison with the London and Pittsburgh Summits of 2009, when the imperative of crisis response motivated leaders, finance ministers, and central bankers to coordinate effectively with each other. Subsequent summits have lacked the same sense of urgency and have failed to deliver any kind of agenda that can be pinpointed as clearly as “saving the global economy.” This week’s summit in Hamburg, Germany promises more of the same, with the real possibility that the G20’s stock could fall even further at the hands of a non-cooperative US delegation.
Given this peril, it’s important to recognize that the G20 has had some successes since the global financial crisis. First and foremost, a global commit to address climate change has depended on important groundwork and commitments made within the G20. Second, even as conflict and failures continued to define key elements of the trade and macroeconomic agenda, steady adherence to core principles within the G20 arguably played a salutary role in the face of difficult national politics. And finally, the G20’s clear prioritization of infrastructure investment, initially as a developing country issue and then as a universal agenda item, has no doubt motivated much of the recent work in institutions like the multilateral development banks (MDBs).
And so last fall, as we looked forward to Germany’s G20 leadership for 2017, we might have expected more of the same—an ever-expanding and diluted agenda, punctuated by moments of low-key progress on some issues. But after the election of Donald Trump in the United States, what the Germans and other G20 countries are now discovering by its absence is the degree to which the United States itself has long been the primary motivator behind a globally-oriented G20 agenda. No longer is there a US-backed G20 agenda that seeks to combat climate change, coordinate on macroeconomic policy, avoid trade protectionism, or elevate support for initiatives in developing countries.
If a shift in orientation in Washington is clear, what remains less clear is just how far the White House will go to disavow the sprawling G20 agenda of the past seven years or how much (and how well) the rest of the G20 might seek to counter the Trump administration’s more damaging tendencies. On the latter, Chancellor Merkel has vowed to make a strong push at this week’s summit in favor of a robust climate agenda. And on the former, the White House itself is showing signs of adopting the playbook of the last seven years, using the G20 to roll out a new initiative on women’s entrepreneurship in developing countries.
Taking these two data points as some grounds for hope, here at CGD we have thoughts on various elements of the G20 agenda and how they might see progress at this week’s summit.
Take serious action on displacement and migration – Jeremy Konyndyk
The G20 Summit could be an important opportunity to advance a constructive agenda on displacement and migration—but don’t hold your breath. The G20 has had migration and refugee challenges on the agenda for several years running now but delivered little real change. And the global politics of this issue are, if anything, even more problematic this year. Last year’s G20 took place a few weeks before President Obama’s summit on refugee issues at the UN General Assembly—a perfect moment to demonstrate the G20’s relevance and resolve on the issue. Instead, the summit did little to advance the agenda apart from some general (and target-free) language on burden sharing in the summit communique, while the summit annex documents (where the real commitments reside) didn’t touch on these issues at all.
As for this year’s summit, it is hard to be optimistic. President Trump is showing that he sees refugee and migration policy mainly as a law enforcement issue. Rather than sharing the burden of global displacement, his plans to cut refugee resettlement in the United States mean the US will be putting more of the global burden on frontline states that are already overwhelmed. The UK looks ill-suited to lead on this issue as well, with migration policy politicized by Brexit, and Prime Minister May’s government hobbled by the recent election. If there is any hope for a good outcome, it rests with Germany and France, whose leaders have actively pushed back on the sort of isolationist rhetoric that has characterized US and UK migration politics for the past year. But even the EU’s policy has been focused on minimizing migration into the Union while refugee drown by the thousands in the Mediterranean. I would love to see a G20 agreement that takes serious action on the deadly migration routes through the Mediterranean by developing safer legal options, and proposes a real framework for global burden sharing on refugee resettlement. But it’s hard to hold out much hope.
Support private investment in Africa – Scott Morris
This week’s summit will officially launch the G20’s Compact with Africa Initiative, which aims to support private investment in Africa. The compacts will seek to improve the conditions for private investment through comprehensive, coordinated, country-specific investment compacts between select African countries and multi- and bilateral development partners. Arguably, the G20’s political support will lend the compacts credibility, visibility and scale. From this standpoint, not all G20 countries are equal, and perhaps more than any of the others, China could make or break this initiative given the scale of its bilateral investments in Africa.
Keep up the good work on digital financial inclusion – Liliana Rojas-Suarez
I have high expectations for the upcoming G20 Summit. The G20 has made commendable progress in assessing and promoting digital financial inclusion initiatives through its Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), building on the work of the previous Summit in Hangzhou, where the G20 leaders endorsed the High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion. The G20 recognizes that inclusive digital payment systems are fundamental to providing basic financial services to excluded populations
More recently, the G20 has taken an active role in reviewing improvements in the provision of digital finance. By presenting different approaches, the G20 is highlighting various paths countries have taken, or can take, to achieve greater financial inclusion. In a recent publication, Digital Financial Inclusion: Emerging Policy Approaches, the G20 highlights a sample of national initiatives, focusing on its High-Level Principles.
As I have reported before, Principles 2, 3, and 7, in particular, are very much aligned with the 2016 CGD Task Force Report, Financial Regulations for Improving Financial Inclusion. For example, Principle 2, “Balance innovation and risk to achieve financial inclusion,” encapsulates the analytical backdrop which frames the CGD report; whereas, Principle 3, “Provide an enabling and proportionate legal and regulatory framework,” describes the core aims of the CGD report and underlines the necessity of proper financial regulation. Principle 7, “Facilitate customer identification for digital financial services,” emphasizes how strong national identification ID systems can improve Know-Your-Costumer (KYC) compliance—one of the key focuses of the CGD Report. Both the G20 and the CGD reports underscore multiple innovations that are fostering digital financial inclusion. Beyond the well-known case of Kenya’s mobile money transfer services (M-Pesa), Peru and Tanzania’s digital payments ecosystems are also discussed (Billetera Móvil and Tigo Pesa respectively). And India’s unique biometric ID system (Aadhaar) is inspiring similar initiatives in other developing countries.
But of course, much remains to be done. I hope that the upcoming G20 Summit catalyzes further action towards achieving more accessible and digitally supportive financial systems, and also, that the G20 reports on more successful experiences in future publications.
Move the AMR response from “concern” to concrete commitments – Rachel Silverman
Once esoteric, the challenge of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has received increasing global attention in recent years, including a landmark UNGA resolution last September and inclusion on this year’s list of G20 priorities. But as I’ve previously discussed, it’s relatively easy (though important) for the global community to express concern; the hard part is identifying and agreeing to concrete measures to address the problem. The scope and scale of the AMR crisis may be daunting, but the G20 has an opportunity to get the ball rolling, potentially by honing in on one or two manageable pieces of the puzzle where concrete action is possible. In particular, policy change to tackle inappropriate antimicrobial use is politically sensitive, but enormously important and thus far largely neglected. G20 leaders could start by tackling antimicrobial use for growth promotion in agriculture; for inspiration, I suggest they read my colleagues’ proposal for an international treaty to reduce antimicrobial use in livestock. And as always, additional funding commitments would certainly be welcome; the World Bank estimates that an effective AMR response would come at a $9 billion per year price tag relative to the 2016 baseline—and there’s still a long way to go.
Empower all women entrepreneurs – Tanvi Jaluka and Mayra Buvinic
However, in order for the fund to deliver on its promise of empowering women entrepreneurs, it must incorporate three considerations. Firstly, the fund’s governance structure must be inclusive. The fund would benefit most from diversity in leadership—including representatives from developing countries, grassroots organizations, and the private sector—rather than prioritizing donors. Secondly, the fund’s approach must be holistic. While access to capital is a significant barrier for women entrepreneurs, most women also face a range of socio-cultural challenges. Tackling these barriers requires the creation of an environment enabling of business, which means that the fund should address the lack of family planning, healthcare, child care, education, and capabilities available to women in addition to financial constraints. Lastly, it is key to recognize that SMEs do not encompass the poorest of women entrepreneurs, whose businesses operate at the micro-level. Indeed, as it stands, only one-third of SMEs are owned by women; most women’s work is represented in the informal sector. While the fund has the potential to remove some barriers for SMEs, it will not be a “silver bullet” to promote economic empowerment for all women.
The terminology describing economic programs for women has changed—actions to “empower women economically” have replaced efforts to “increase women’s economic participation and income.” This shift in language makes sense intuitively and has solid conceptual backing (in the work of Amartya Sen, for example) but, is there a difference between economic advancement and empowerment? And have measures changed in tandem with this change in terminology?
The short answer to the first question is yes—to the second, no.
This is partly because the empowerment process is mostly unobservable and depends on self-reporting; it is also messy, covering many different domains. The conceptual literature is rich in normative views (Wonder Woman comes to mind when reading some of the literature!) that do not translate easily into empirical measures. This difficulty has added to the disconnect that exists between theory and measurement—with measures lagging significantly behind theory.
Different features of subjective empowerment, such as ability to decide on family planning, autonomy over how to use individual savings, or freedom to vote mediate different empowerment outcomes, and research should measure the appropriate feature. These features will vary across the different domains—i.e., social, economic, and political, as the examples above indicate—and there is no reason to assume that empowerment in one domain will necessarily carry over to others. Researchers need to be much more discriminating in their choice of empowerment indicators, and not assume that, for instance, decision-making over household expenditures (one of the most commonly used measures) is always the valid indicator to use, regardless of the context and the domain.
Even within a specific domain, such as economic empowerment, features may vary with the type or sub-set of economic activity: while financial autonomy may be the critical feature to measure for women entrepreneurs and for young women, stress may be the right measure for women wage and salary workers. Measures should also be able to capture the empowerment effects of “smart” designs—for instance, interventions that encourage privacy (such as using mobile phones for financial transactions), should be tracked using indicators of autonomy and self-reliance over financial decisions.
The road ahead: different measures for different women
The task ahead is to identify suitable attitudinal and behavioral measures of economic empowerment, perhaps differentiating by sub-sets of economic activity (farming, entrepreneurship, wage, and salary work) and by age. Adolescent girls and young women may need different measures or measures calibrated differently. Building a standardized, cross-culturally comparable measure of economic empowerment, while a worthy objective, can begin only after suitable measures for sub-categories of activities and both young and adult women have been identified and tested in different contexts. Another task is to construct and test empowerment measures for collectives or communities. These tasks are challenging but necessary, especially if the final objective is to promote and, therefore, track and measure women’s economic empowerment as well as advancement.
Child marriage is associated with bad outcomes for women and girls. We develop a simple model to explain how enforcing minimum age-of-marriage laws creates differences in the share of women getting married at the legal cut-off. By this measure, most countries are not enforcing the laws on their books and enforcement is not getting better over time.