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CGD research explores how international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, multilateral development banks, and other international development agencies can become more responsive to the needs of developing countries. The Center’s work concerns itself with the future of these institutions, all of which are facing shifts in demand for their traditional services, the emergence of new institutions, and reform of their leadership selection processes.
This brief summarizes five key recommendations from the CGD book A Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance, and Reform by Kemal Dervis. It presses for reform on a broad front with a renewed, more legitimate, and more effective United Nations as the overarching framework for global governance based on global consent.
The Center for Global Development and the Institute for International Economics launched the new book, Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture by Nancy Birdsall and John Williamson with Brian Deese.
Center for Global Development non-resident fellow and professor at the Kennedy School of Government Lant Pritchett and Harvard University Professor Michael Woolcock presented "Solutions when the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development."
In the run-up to the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, CGD hosted a two-part conference. Part One was Financing for Development: Regional Challenges and the Regional Development Banks. Part Two was New Proposals On Financing For Development.
A Better Globalization: Legitimacy, Governance, and Reform by Kemal Dervis is a reformist manifesto that argues that gradual institutional change can produce beneficial results if it is driven by an ambitious long-term vision and by a determination to continually widen the limits of the possible.
The tragedy of foreign aid is not that it didn't work; it was never really tried. A group of well-meaning national and international bureaucracies dispensed foreign aid under conditions in which bureaucracy does not work well. The hostile environment under which such aid agencies functioned induced them to organize a cartel that increased inefficiency and reduced effective supply of development services, frustrating the good intentions and dedication of development professionals. The cartel of good intentions allows rich country politicians to feel that they are doing all in their power to help the world's poor, supports rich nations' foreign policy goals, preserves a panoply of large national and international institutions, and provides resources to poor country politicians with which to buy political support; in short, foreign aid works for everyone except for those whom it was intended to help.
In this paper we argue that neither the level nor the change in a country's trade/GDP ratio can be taken as an indication of the "openness" of a country's trade policy. In particular, we examine the ways in which terms of trade shifts have affected trade/GDP ratio over the past two decades, and find that the empirical evidence offered by the existing literature overstates the importance of trade policy in economic growth.
The IMF uses its well-known "financial programming" model to derive monetary and fiscal programs to achieve desired macroeconomic targets in countries undergoing crises or receiving debt relief. Financial programming is based on monetary, balance of payments, and fiscal accounting identities. This paper subjects the identity-based framework to a variety of tests. All of the identities contain large statistical discrepancies, which weakens the case for them as a "consistency check." In addition, the financial programming approach is flawed because it does not take into account the endogeneity of virtually all the variables in each macroeconomic identity, the instability of its simple behavioral assumptions, and the large statistical discrepancies in all the identities. Accounting identities do not a macro model make.